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132 
JUSTICE OR PEACE? A PROPOSAL FOR 
RESOLVING THE DILEMMA 
Kenneth Williams 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The civil war in Syria has created a dilemma for the inter-
national community.  Over 100,000 Syrians have been killed 
during the civil war.1  Many of these deaths were the result of 
human rights violations committed by both government forces 
and anti-government armed groups.  According to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council,2 government forces have 
“committed the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, 
rape, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts.”3  Gov-
ernment forces have also committed “war crimes and gross vio-
lations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
including arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful attack, at-
tacking protected objects, and pillaging and destruction of 
property.”4  The Human Rights Council found that “anti-
government armed groups have committed war crimes, includ-
ing murder, torture, hostage-taking and attacking protected ob-
                                                             
1 UN Human Rights Council Calls for end to Syria fighting, condemns 
foreign fighters, UN NEWS CENTRE (May 29, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/ 
news/story.asp?NewsID=45033&Cr=Syria&CR1=UajjBuBpBD0.  
2 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNSEL, http://www.ohchr.org/en/ 
hrbodies/hrc/pages/hrcindex.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2014)(The Human 
Rights Council is a body within the United Nations.  It is made up of 47 rotat-
ing United Nations Member States and is responsible for promoting and pro-
tecting human rights.  It addresses situations of systemic human rights viola-
tions and makes recommendations on them.). 
3 Rep. of the Indep. Int Nat’l Comm’n. of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Re-
public, Human Rights Council, Rep. on its 22nd Sess., Feb. 5, 2013, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013) at 1, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/22/59 [hereinaf-
ter February 2013 Report]. The Council also concluded that “war crimes and 
crimes against humanity have become a daily reality in Syria where the har-
rowing accounts of victims have seared themselves on our conscience.” Rep. of 
the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (Jul. 18, 2013) at 2, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/23/58 [hereinaf-
ter July 2013 Report].   
4 February 2013 Report, supra note 3 at 1. 
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jects.”5  These groups have endangered civilians, “by position-
ing military objectives inside civilian areas . . . [and have] car-
ried out bombings in predominately civilian areas . . .”6 The 
Human Rights Council further found that both government 
forces and anti-government armed groups violated internation-
al law by involving children in the armed conflict.7  The Human 
Rights Council also found that “[t]here are reasonable grounds 
to believe that chemical agents have been used as weapons,” 
which would constitute a war crime.8 
As a result of these egregious human rights violations, the 
Human Rights Council naturally concluded that “[e]nsuring 
the accountability of all parties for crimes committed is imper-
ative.”9 Therefore, the Human Rights Council recommended 
that the Security Council10 take appropriate action to ensure 
that those responsible for these crimes be brought to justice.11  
The dilemma for the Security Council is that if it were to accept 
the Human Rights Council’s recommendation, it would have to 
refer the situation to the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”),12 and doing so may impair the prospects for peace. If 
the situation is referred to the ICC, neither the government 
forces in Syria, nor the anti-government armed groups, will 
have any incentive to end the civil war since they know that 
                                                             
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 July 2013 report, supra note 3 at 2. 
9 February 2013 Report, supra note 3 at 2. 
10 The Security Council consists of fifteen members of the United Na-
tions.  Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides the Council with the 
authority to take any measures it deems appropriate whenever there has 
been a threat to international peace and security.  Its resolutions require the 
unanimous consent of its 5 permanent members: the United States, China, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and France.  Its resolutions are binding on the 
members of the United Nations.  See U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1, art. 27, 
para. 3, art. 41, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/ 
uncharter-all-lang.pdf. 
11The Council recommended that the Security Council “[i]n the light of 
the gravity of the violations and crimes perpetrated by Government forces 
and anti-Government groups, take appropriate action and commit to human 
rights and the rule of law by means of referral to justice, possibly to the In-
ternational Criminal Court, bearing in mind that, in the context of the Syrian 
Arab Republic, only the Security Council is competent to refer the situation to 
the Court . . . ”  February 2013 Report, supra note 3 at 26. 
12 Id. 
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they are likely to be prosecuted for the crimes that they have 
committed.13 The international community has previously faced 
this dilemma,14 and will certainly have to wrestle with this 
question in the future, in a nation like Cuba for instance.15  
Cuba has a long history of repression, but is likely to become 
more democratic in the future.     
 This article will address the question of how the interna-
tional community should respond when the pursuit of justice 
and the attainment of peace are incompatible.  It begins with 
an overview of the international human rights movement prior 
to World War II, a period when there was almost no effort to 
hold human rights violators accountable.  The article then dis-
cusses how Nuremberg transformed international human 
rights law and created the framework for holding individuals 
accountable for committing egregious human rights violations.  
In the next section there is a discussion of how, despite Nu-
remberg, there was an era of impunity as a result of the Cold 
War.  The Cold War permitted many of the twentieth century’s 
worst human rights violators to escape accountability for their 
actions.  Next, there is a discussion of how the end of the Cold 
War ushered in a new era of accountability; specifically, in this 
new era many human rights violators have been brought to 
justice.   
This article suggests that although this new era is wel-
come, a onesize fits all approach should not be adopted.  Ra-
ther, this paper  proposes that whether human rights violators 
                                                             
13 See Id.  The Human Rights Council is recommending that the ICC in-
vestigate whether both sides have committed crimes during the civil war.   
14 In Uganda, The Lords Resistance Army resists negotiations to end that 
country’s civil war in part because of the threat of trial before the ICC.  In 
Kenya, ICC indictees have successfully used their arrest warrants to rally 
public sympathy, strengthen the loyalty of compatriots, and secure a victory 
at the ballot box.  After the ICC indicted Sudan’s President Bashir, he has 
been successfully re-elected, traveled extensively, and has received support 
from his African Union allies.  Bashir has forced several leading international 
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations out of the country for allegedly 
cooperating with the ICC.  Leslie Vinjamuri, Peace May Require Forgoing 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/ 
2013/03/04/can-we-afford-to-forgive-atrocities/peace-may-require-forgoing-
justice. 
15 See Universal Periodic Review: HRW Submission on Cuba, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (April 18, 2013), www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universal-
periodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba.  
3
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should be prosecuted needs to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  It may very well be that in particular situations, an at-
tempt to prosecute may make it more difficult to attain peace 
and that other approaches may be necessary.  The approach 
taken by South Africa, creating a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and granting amnesty to many perpetrators is ex-
amined and supports the position that flexibility is needed 
when dealing with human rights violators.  Finally, the article 
recommends that when faced with a justice versus peace di-
lemma, the Security Council should be given the authority to 
suspend criminal proceedings if it determines that the threat of 
criminal prosecution presents a risk to international peace and 
security.  
II. INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
A. Before 1945 
 Despite several documents asserting individual rights, 
including the Magna Carta (1215),16 the Petition of Right 
(1628),17 the English Bill of Rights (1689),18 the French Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789),19 the United 
                                                             
16 The Magna Carta established the principle that individuals could not 
be punished arbitrarily. See Magna Carta, ch. 16-17 (1215), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm.  
17 Initiated by Sir Edward Coke, the Petition of Right asserted four prin-
ciples: 1) no taxes could be levied without the consent of Parliament; 2) no 
subject could be imprisoned without cause shown; 3) no soldiers could be 
quartered upon the citizenry; 4) martial law may not be used in peacetime. 
See Petition of Rights, 1628, 3 & 4 Car. 1, (Eng.), available at 
http:www.britannia.com/history/docs/petition.html.  
18 The English Bill of Rights contained certain basic rights including: 
prohibitions on excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments; prohibited 
taxation without representation; granted the freedom to petition the monarch 
without fear of retribution; prohibited royal interference in the election of 
parliament. See English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., (Eng.), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/bor/eng_bor.htm.  
19 The French Declaration proclaimed a number of rights, including the 
right to be free of arbitrary detention, the right to be presumed innocent until 
declared guilty, the right to freedom of religion, and the right to speak, write, 
and print freely. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen is 
available at www.constitution.org/fr/fr_drm.htm.  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
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States Bill of Rights (1789),20 there was virtually no interna-
tional human rights movement prior to World War II.  That is 
because, prior to World War II, a State’s treatment of its own 
nationals and those under its jurisdiction was considered an in-
ternal matter and not a matter of international concern.21  As a 
result, there was generally no individual accountability under 
international law for violations of human dignity.  There were, 
however, two human rights issues that aroused international 
concern: slavery and the manner in which war was conducted.   
i. The Movement to Abolish Slavery  
Abolitionists used both domestic law and treaties to abol-
ish slavery and the slave trade.  These treaties prohibited slav-
ery, trading in slaves, and permitted the searching of ships 
suspected of transporting individuals to be sold into slavery, 
and established mixed tribunals in ports around the world to 
condemn slave ships.22  In addition to prohibiting slavery and 
the slave trade, some of these treaties required signatories to 
criminalize slave trading and to prosecute offenders.  For in-
stance, the Slavery Convention requires domestic criminaliza-
tion and prosecution of slavery.  Article 6 provides that: 
. . .those of the high Contracting Parties whose laws do not at 
present make adequate provision for the punishment of infrac-
tions of laws and regulations enacted with a view to giving effect 
to the purposes of the present Convention undertake to adopt the 
necessary measures in order that severe penalties may be im-
posed in respect of such infractions.23 
ii. The Regulation of War 
 The other human rights issue which received attention 
from the international community prior to World War II was 
the effort, beginning in ancient times, to limit the horrors of 
                                                             
20 See generally U.S. Const. amends. 1-10. 
21 See Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights 
System, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 783, 783-85 (2006).   
22 See Suzanne Miers, Slavery and the Slave Trade as International Is-
sues 1890-1939, in 19(2) SLAVERY AND ABOLITION: A JOURNAL OF SLAVE AND 
POST-SLAVE STUDIES 16-37 (1998). 
23 Slavery Convention art. 6, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S 254, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/SlaveryConvention.aspx 
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war: 
Recorded history confirms that the ancient Israelites, Greeks, 
and Romans, for example, distinguished between combatants and 
civilians and made only the former the lawful object of attack.  
There are African and Islamic traditions dictating that captured 
combatants and civilians should be humanely treated.  Likewise, 
in ancient combat, certain weapons or tactics were prohibited if 
they caused excessive damage.  The codes of chivalry developed 
in Medieval Europe set forth rules of combat that applied within 
the knighthood.  In 1139, for example, the Second Lateran Coun-
cil condemned the use of weapons viewed as unnecessarily cruel 
or inhumane.24 
The movement to codify these principles began with the 
Hague Conventions of 189925 and 1907.26  The Hague Conven-
tions codified the fundamental principle that “[t]he right of bel-
ligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlim-
ited.”27  The Conventions specifically prohibited the use of 
poisoned weapons, the killing or wounding of those belligerents 
who have laid down their weapons and no longer present a 
threat, and means of warfare “calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering.” Also,the destruction or seizure of enemy property 
was prohibited unless “imperatively demanded by the necessi-
ties of war,” and the attack of undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings.28   
 In addition to regulating the manner in which war is 
conducted, treaties and laws have been enacted making indi-
viduals accountable for violating the laws of war since the 
prosecution by an English court in 1305 of Scottish national Sir 
                                                             
24 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, in UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 13 (2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016152 See also Hague Convention IV, An-
nex, art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2301-02 (“It is especially forbid-
den . . . [t]o kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile 
nation or army . . .”).  
25See Hague Convention of 1899, Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating 
Gases, Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839-40, available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
aplic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2531E92D28
2B5436C12563CD00516149. 
26 Hague Convention of 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2301-02, available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
ihl.nsf/INTRO/195. 
27 Id. at 22. 
28 Id. at 23. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
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William Wallace.29  Sir Wallace was convicted and ultimately 
executed for waging a war against the English, “sparing nei-
ther age nor sex, monk nor nun.”30  The first treaty provision, 
requiring individual accountability for war crimes, was con-
tained in the Brussels Conference of 1874, which produced a fi-
nal protocol that was signed by 15 European states but never 
ratified.31  Paragraph III stated: 
The laws and customs of war not only forbid unnecessary cruelty 
and acts of barbarism committed against the enemy; they de-
mand also, on the part of the appropriate authorities, the imme-
diate punishment of these persons who are guilty of these acts, if 
they are not caused by an absolute necessity.32  
The United States accepted the principle that war could 
not be conducted indiscriminately as early as the American 
Civil War.  During the Civil War, Henry Wirz, a Confederate 
Captain was accused of mistreating and murdering Union sol-
diers detained in prison in violation of the laws and customs of 
war.33  He was convicted and ultimately executed for his ac-
tions during the war.34  The United States continued to hold 
individuals accountable for violating the laws of war during the 
Spanish American War.  Following the war, the United States 
convened a number of military commissions to prosecute Fili-
pino insurgents for abuses committed against Filipinos during 
the war. 35   
 After World War I, a failed effort was made to prosecute 
both the perpetrators of genocide on the Armenian population 
and Germans for crimes committed during the war.36  The 
League of Nations was established after the war along with an 
advisory commission convened in connection with the League 
of Nations.37  This advisory commission recommended the crea-
tion of a permanent criminal court to have jurisdiction over 
“crimes constituting a breach of international public order 
                                                             
29 VAN SCHAACK, supra note 24 at 19. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 19. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 20. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 21-26. 
37 Id. at 27. 
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against the universal law of nations.”38  The League of Nations, 
however, rejected the proposal as premature.39   
B. Nuremberg 
 As a result of the atrocities committed by the Nazis dur-
ing World War II, the international community rejected the no-
tion that how a nation treats its own citizens is solely a matter 
of domestic jurisdiction.40  The Nazis committed numerous hu-
man rights violations during the war, including the killing of 
six million Jews, the killing and mistreatment of prisoners of 
war, and the wanton destruction of towns and communities.41  
Several significant developments occurred as a result of the 
Nazi atrocities: the establishment of international criminal tri-
bunals to hold those responsible for human rights violations 
accountable; the development of international human rights 
laws and international criminal laws; the creation of the Unit-
ed Nations; and acceptance of universal jurisdiction, allowing 
any nation to prosecute human rights violators. 
i. International Military Tribunals 
 The four Allied Powers42 decided that those responsible 
for these crimes had to be punished. As a result, in 1945, the 
Allied Powers created the International Military Tribunal “for 
the just and prompt trial and punishment of major war crimi-
nals of the European Axis.”43  The Allied Powers also created 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in order to 
try major Japanese war criminals.44  The two International 
                                                             
38 Id. at 27. 
39 Id. 
40 See Burco Baytemir, The International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg: The Ongoing Reflections In International Criminal Law, 3 USAK 
YEARBOOK OF INT’L POLITICS AND LAW 77, 82 (2010).  
41 See Trial of the Major War Criminals, Judgment and Sentences, INT’L 
MIL. TRIB (Oct. 1, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 186 (1947). 
42 The Four Allied Powers were the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Soviet Union. 
43 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Crim-
inals of the European Axis, art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 
279. 
44 This tribunal was similar to Nuremberg and was based largely on the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.  See generally Charter of the Interna-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
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Military Tribunals were the first internationally created 
courts, composed of judges from different countries, established 
to try defendants for internationally created crimes.45  The two 
tribunals were provided jurisdiction over three crimes: war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace.46   
The Nuremberg and Japanese Tribunals resulted in the 
prosecution and conviction of numerous high ranking leaders.47  
The tribunals, however, were criticized on two grounds.  First, 
they were criticized for prosecuting crimes that were not at the 
time clearly established in international law.48  Second, the tri-
bunals were open to the charge of “victor’s justice” since only 
the losers were put on trial by the winners.49  Although these 
are both legitimate criticisms, the tribunals fundamentally al-
tered international law.  After Nuremberg, states can no longer 
claim that what happens within its own borders is its own 
business.50  The Nuremberg tribunal has also made it clear 
that individuals are not excused from liability for the crimes 
that they committed because they were following orders.51  
Thus, Nuremberg gave birth to the entire paradigm of individ-
ual criminal responsibility under international law.  The Unit-
ed Nations’ International Law Commission (ILC) has described 
the principle of individual responsibility and punishment for 
crimes under international law recognized at Nuremberg as the 
“cornerstone of international criminal law” and the “enduring 
legacy of the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal.”52   
                                                                                                                                        
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Proclamation by the Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Charter dated Jan. 9, 
1946, amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4 Bevans 20.   
45Id. at 83. 
46 Id. at 82. 
47 Id. at 81. 
48 Id. at 85. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 86-89. 
51 Id. at 83.  
52 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Eighth Session, May 6-July 26, 1996, Official Records of the General Assem-
bly Fifty-First Session, Supplement No. 10, at p. 19, available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_51_10.pdf.  
9
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ii. The United Nations 
The horrors of World War II also led to the creation of the 
United Nations,53 and the UN Charter contained several refer-
ences to human rights.  The Preamble to the Charter states the 
determination of the peoples of the United Nations “to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights.”54  Article 55 provides that 
UN members “shall promote . . . universal respect for, and ob-
servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”55  
Article 56 requires members to cooperate in the promotion of 
human rights. 56 Article 68 of the UN Charter contemplated the 
establishment of a human rights commission to conduct re-
search on human rights and to draft treaties and other instru-
ments for the articulation and promotion of human rights. 57  
By inserting these provisions into the Charter, the founders of 
the United Nations made clear that their intent was to play a 
major role in protecting and promoting human rights. 
C. Post Nuremberg  
i. International Crimes  
The three international crimes created by the tribunals–
crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity–quickly ripened into customary international law.58  
                                                             
53 See UN at a Glance, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
54 U.N. CHARTER, preamble. 
55 Id. at art. 55. 
56 Id. at art. 56. 
57 Id. at art. 68. 
58 The U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution affirm-
ing the principles established by the International Military Tribunals.  The 
resolution provides in pertinent part:The General Assembly…Affirms the 
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal; Directs the Committee on the 
codification of international law established by the resolution of the General 
Assembly of 11 December 1946, to treat as a matter of primary importance 
plans for the formulation, in the context of a general codification of offenses 
against the peace and security of mankind, or of an International Criminal 
Code, of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
and in the judgment of the Tribunal.Affirmation of the Principles of Interna-
tional Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 
95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc A/236 at 1144 (Dec. 11, 1946).   
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
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Since World War II, these crimes have been supplemented and 
new international crimes have been created.  International 
criminal law continued to develop through a series of United 
Nations sponsored multilateral treaties and declarations.   
 Immediately after Nuremberg, in response to the Nazi 
extermination of Jews, the international community made gen-
ocide a crime, by agreeing to the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.59  Although the 
crimes against humanity created by the Nuremberg charter 
overlap with genocide, the Genocide Convention broadens the 
conduct that is punishable.  Article I provides that genocide 
could occur either during times of peace or during war.60  Arti-
cle II defines genocide as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” by killing or 
causing serious injury to the group, inflicting conditions on the 
group likely to bring about its physical destruction, imposing 
measures to prevent births within the group and forcibly trans-
ferring children of the group to another group.61  Most im-
portantly, Article V requires state parties “to enact, in accord-
ance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary 
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Con-
vention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for 
persons guilty of genocide.”62    Article VI requires that individ-
uals accused of genocide be tried, either in the territory in 
which the acts of genocide occurred or in any international tri-
bunal.63   
The international community also adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)64 and the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),65 estab-
lishing several important norms.  Both the UDHR and the 
ICCPR specify that international law prohibits the arbitrary 
                                                             
59 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
60 Id. at art. I. 
61 Id. at art. II. 
62 Id. at art. V. 
63 Id. at art. VI. 
64 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
65 Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY 
DOC. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
11
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deprivation of life, prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment,66  slavery and the slave 
trade,67 and discrimination based on race and other status.68 
These international norms have been widely adopted in region-
al treaties such as the American Convention on Human 
Rights,69 the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,70 the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights,71 and the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights.72 The arbitrary deprivation of life, slavery, apartheid 
and torture has all since become international crimes. Because 
of the widespread use of torture against political opponents by 
repressive governments, a treaty was created to specifically 
address this crime.  The Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment73 not 
only prohibits state parties from engaging in torture or cruel, 
inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment but also declares 
that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
torture.”74  The Convention further requires parties to “take ef-
fective, legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures 
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdic-
tion.”75  State parties are required to make torture a violation 
of its domestic laws,76 and Article 7 of the Convention requires 
                                                             
66 Id. at art. 7. 
67 Id. at art. 8. 
68 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1. 
69 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
70 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
71 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
72 See League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 
2004 reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) (entered into force Mar. 
15, 2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38540.html.  
73 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. (1988) (entered into force on June 26, 
1987).  
74 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 2.  
75 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1. 
76 Id. at art. 4. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
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state parties either to prosecute individuals who have been ac-
cused of torture or to extradite them for prosecution.77   
 The international community continues to make it a 
crime for individuals to engage in aggressive war tactics and 
has reaffirmed this principle.78  Although engaging in war in 
violation of international law has been a crime since Nurem-
berg, contemporary international criminal tribunals have not 
prosecuted anyone for aggression.79   
 Finally, it is still an international crime to fight a war 
indiscriminately.  Since the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907, an extensive body of treaty law has been created to regu-
late the manner in which war is to be conducted.  Most notable 
are the Geneva Conventions.  The aim of the Geneva Conven-
tions is to protect the victims of war: the wounded and the sick 
in the field;80 the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea;81 
prisoners of war;82 civilians under control of an enemy power.83  
In addition, the principle of distinction requires combatants to 
distinguish between military and non-military targets.  Thus, 
attacks on civilian targets are prohibited.84  Those individuals 
                                                             
77 Id. at art. 7, ¶ 1. 
78  U.N. CHARTER art.2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The Charter does contain 
two exceptions: the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense and 
collective security measures authorized by the Security Council).   
79 Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 
53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 358, 360-61 (2012) (“Nevertheless, the modern interna-
tional tribunals established by the Security Council were not provided juris-
diction over this crime; rather, the Council confined their jurisdiction to war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.”). 
80 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).  
81 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked members at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).  
82 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 
1950).  
83 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950).   
84 JIMMY GURULE & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-
TERRORISM LAW, 71 (2011) (“The principle of distinction establishes a pre-
13
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who kill, injure, and destroy property in violation of the Geneva 
Conventions can be held criminally responsible for their ac-
tions.  
ii. Universal Jurisdiction  
The events of World War II and Nuremberg also helped to 
establish the principle of universal jurisdiction.  Universal ju-
risdiction has made it easier to bring human rights violators to 
justice.  Universal jurisdiction was first asserted at Nuremberg 
as the basis for prosecuting the perpetrators of the holocaust85 
and has been used frequently since then.  Under international 
law, states need jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws.86    
Universal jurisdiction provides states with jurisdiction over 
acts that are so heinous that they offend the interest of all hu-
manity and as a result, any state may punish its offenders.87  A 
state can exercise universal jurisdiction regardless of where the 
heinous acts occurred and even though the acts had no connec-
tion with the state or its citizens.88  The ability of states to ex-
                                                                                                                                        
sumptive protection for civilians so long as they refrain from taking direct 
part in hostilities they may not be made the deliberate object of attack”). 
85 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgments and Sen-
tences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 216 (1947) (“. . . the Signatory Powers created 
this Tribunal, defined the law it is to administer, and made regulations for 
the proper conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what 
any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any 
nation has the right to set up special courts to administer law”). 
86 See generally United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). 
87 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 285 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2d ed. 2003) (“The crimes over which . . . [universal] jurisdiction may 
be exercised are of such gravity and magnitude that they warrant their uni-
versal prosecution and repression”); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdic-
tion under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 826 (1988) (“Because of 
the global concern with certain heinous offenses, the world community per-
mits every state to define and punish those offenses”); Council of the Europe-
an Union, AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, ¶ 
9, Doc. 8672/1/09/REV1 (Apr. 16, 2009) (“States by and large accept that cus-
tomary international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over 
the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and torture, as well as over piracy”). 
88 See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D.D.C. 1988) (“Ju-
risdiction is conferred in any forum that obtains physical custody of the per-
petrator of certain offenses considered particularly heinous and harmful to 
humanity”); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 
1985) (“International law provides that certain offenses may be punished by 
any state because the offenders are ‘common enemies of mankind and all na-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
5. KENNETH WILLIAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2014  3:59 PM 
146 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
ercise universal jurisdiction is important because it denies safe 
havens for perpetrators of heinous offenses and ensures that 
their crimes do not go unpunished.  It is sometimes the case 
that when egregious crimes are committed, the state where 
these crimes occurred are not able to prosecute the perpetra-
tors.  Universal jurisdiction remedies the problem of states be-
ing unable or unwilling  to prosecute the perpetrators where 
international crimes occurred.    
 Since Nuremberg, states have frequently initiated prose-
cutions based on the universality principle.  For instance, in 
1961, Israel tried Adolph Eichmann. and in 198889 John 
Demjanjuk90 for Nazi atrocities committed before Israel was 
even a state.  The absence of protest against the invocation of 
universal jurisdiction in the Eichmann case signaled the inter-
national community’s acceptance of the principle of universal 
                                                                                                                                        
tions have an equal interest in their apprehension and punishment’”); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The prem-
ise of universal jurisdiction is that a state ‘may exercise jurisdiction to define 
and punish certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of 
universal concern’ . . . even where no other recognized basis of jurisdiction is 
present”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2nd Cir. 1980) (holding 
that it had jurisdiction over torture committed in Paraguay because “the tor-
turer has become - like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani 
generis, an enemy of all mankind”). 
89 See CrimA 336/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Eichmann 
II), 36 I.L.R. 277 (1962).  Eichmann was tried in Israel, convicted and sen-
tenced to death.  In upholding his conviction and death sentence, the Su-
preme Court of Israel stated: 
[T]there is full jurisdiction for applying here the principle of universal ju-
risdiction since the international character of “crimes against humanity” . . . 
dealt with in this case is no longer in doubt . . .[T]he basic reason for which 
international law recognizes the right of each State to exercise such jurisdic-
tion in piracy offences . . . applies with even greater force to the above-
mentioned crimes . . .Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant 
bear an international character, but their harmful and murderous effects 
were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international community 
to its very foundations.  The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant 
to the principle of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of guardian of in-
ternational law and an agent for its enforcement, to try the appellant.  That 
being the case, no importance attaches to the fact that the State of Israel did 
not exist when the offences were committed.   
Id. at 299, 304.   
90 The United States granted Israel’s request to extradite John 
Demjanjuk so that he could be tried in Israel.  U.S. courts held that Israel 
had the right to try him under universal jurisdiction for crimes committed at 
the Treblinka concentration camp.  See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 
(6th Cir. 1985).   
15
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jurisdiction.91 
 To summarize, since World War II and Nuremberg, an 
impressive body of law has developed, which makes individuals 
accountable under international law for several human rights 
violations, including: crimes against humanity, crimes against 
peace, war crimes, torture, genocide, apartheid, and engaging 
in slavery and the slave trade.  Furthermore, as a result of the 
international community’s acceptance of the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction, human rights violators can be brought to 
justice either in domestic courts or in international tribunals.  
However, because of cold war politics and the desire in many 
instances for immediate peace, most individuals who perpe-
trated human rights violations during the cold war were not 
held accountable for their actions.  
III. THE ERA OF IMPUNITY 
Although the Nuremberg precedent was well established, 
and the principle of universality provided forums for holding 
individuals accountable for human rights violations criminal 
prosecutions for human rights violations after World War II 
were rare.  Between World War II and the cold war, there have 
been almost no prosecutions for human rights violations 
which.92  This was due largely to the fact that the international 
criminal justice system had been paralyzed by cold war politics.  
Another factor was the desire to achieve and maintain peace.  
The era of impunity allowed some notorious human rights 
                                                             
91 While the international community did condemn Israel for violating 
Argentina’s territorial sovereignty by kidnapping Eichmann in Argentina, it 
has clearly accepted Israel’s exercise of universal jurisdiction in the Eich-
mann case. In fact, since World War II, there have been prosecutions or in-
vestigations for crimes under international law based on universal jurisdic-
tion in seventeen states (Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States). See Amnesty Int’l, 
Universal Jurisdiction: UN General Assembly Should Support the Essential 
International Justice Tool, at 29, IOR 53/015/2010 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/IOR53/015/2010/en.  
92 Most of the prosecutions after World War II involved individuals ac-
cused of committing war crimes.  For instance, the United States prosecuted 
William Calley for war crimes as a result of his role in the My Lai Massacre.  
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abusers to not only avoid any accountability for their abuses, 
but also to flee with millions of dollars and to live the remain-
der of their lives in luxurious exile.  The situations in post-
World War II Japan, Uganda, Haiti and the Philippines pro-
vide prime examples of the era of impunity..   
 In each of the cases discussed below, the leaders commit-
ted unspeakable atrocities.  However, they provide excellent il-
lustrations of the justice or peace dilemma that the interna-
tional community must often wrestle with.  In post-World War 
II Japan, Emperor Hirohito could have been prosecuted by the 
International Military Tribunal.  The United States was faced 
with the justice or peace dilemma, and chose to sacrifice justice 
in order to maintain peace in Japan.  The international com-
munity did the same in the cases of Idi Amin in Uganda, Jean 
Claude Duvalier in Haiti and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philip-
pines.  In each instance, the decision was made to avoid further 
unrest and bloodshed by allowing these rulers to go into exile.  
Had the international community insisted on holding them ac-
countable for what they had done, it is likely that peace would 
have been more difficult to attain and there would have been 
even more suffering as a result. 
A. Emperor Hirohito of Japan  
Japan committed numerous international crimes during 
World War II.   First, Japan was a party to the Kellogg-Briand 
Peace Pact of 1928 that “condemned recourse to war for the so-
lution of international controversies” and “renounced it as an 
instrument of national policy.”93  Although Japan was a party 
to this international treaty, Japan still committed crimes 
against peace during World War II.  For instance, crimes 
against peace were committed as a result of Japan’s 1931 inva-
sion of Manchuria and its expansion of the war throughout 
China.94  Furthermore, in 1941 and 1942, Japan attacked the 
United States, Malaya, Burma, Singapore, Borneo, Thailand, 
the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, and nu-
                                                             
93 JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DOCUMENTS 139-
40 (1995). 
94 Richard John Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission Cov-
ering World War II Era Japanese War Crimes, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 
63 (2003). 
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merous islands throughout the Pacific Ocean in violation of in-
ternational law.95   
 Second, war crimes were also committed despite the fact 
that Japan was a party to several treaties that governed its 
wartime conduct.96  During the “Rape of Nanking” in December 
1937, Japanese forces captured Nanking and then began a bar-
baric campaign of terror against the Chinese soldiers and civil-
ians.97  Military orders directed that Chinese POWs be execut-
ed,98and  during a single mass execution, Japanese forces 
murdered over 57,000 POWs and civilians.99  Japanese soldiers 
engaged in competitions to determine who could kill the most 
Chinese POWs in the shortest period of time.100  Altogether, 
Japanese forces killed an estimated 260,000 Chinese victims in 
Nanking.101  During its military campaign against China, Ja-
pan also conducted scientific nonconsensual experiments on 
Chinese POWs and civilians.102  Throughout the war, the Japa-
nese murdered POWs,  forced them to do hard labor and tor-
tured them.103  Japanese forces forcibly put POWs to work on 
Japanese military projects such as the Burma-Thailand Rail-
road.104  Twenty-seven percent of Allied POWs held in Japan 
died (35,756 out of 132,134), including a death rate of thirty-six 
percent (36%) for Australian POWs.105  By contrast, only four 
                                                             
95 Id. 
96 Japan was a party to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex of Regulations Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  Article 4 of the Regulations requires 
that prisoners of war “be humanely treated.  Article 46 Provides: “Family 
honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as reli-
gious convictions and practice must be respected.”  Japan was also a party to 
the 1899 Hague Declarations and a series of 1907 Conventions that ad-
dressed the rights on non-combatants and different aspects of naval warfare.  
Japan also signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Meth-
ods of Warfare on June 17, 1925.  See Id. at 63.   
97 Id. at 63. 




102 Id. at 65-66. 
103 Id. at 68-69. 
104 Id. at 69. 
105 Id. at 68. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
5. KENNETH WILLIAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2014  3:59 PM 
150 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
percent (4%) (9348 out of 235,473) of Allied POWs held in POW 
camps in Germany and Italy died.106  One study suggests that 
had World War II extended into one more winter, “very few or 
none” of the POWs in Japan would have survived.107   
 Third, Japanese forces were also responsible for crimes 
against humanity.  During the “Rape of Nanking,” Chinese 
non-combatants were raped and killed by Japanese forces.  It is 
estimated that between 20,000 and 80,000 Chinese women 
were raped.108  Chinese civilians were murdered by gruesome 
methods including burying people alive, extirpating body parts, 
freezing people to death, using attack dogs and bayoneting ba-
bies.109  Scientific experiments were also performed on civil-
ians.110   Japan also committed crimes against humanity 
through the adoption of its comfort women system.  Japan 
adopted the comfort women system to avoid the mass rapes of 
civilians that occurred in Nanking.111   The comfort women sys-
tem involved procuring women to serve as sex slaves for the 
Japanese military.  Women were obtained through deception, 
coercion or outright forcible abduction.112  They were kept in fa-
cilities “surrounded by a barbed wire fence, well-guarded and 
patrolled.”113  The “comfort women” were repeatedly raped on a 
daily basis often for a total of at least nine hours a day.114  At 
the end of the war, many of these women were murdered.115  
Those who were not murdered were simply left behind to fend 
for themselves.116  The comfort women system was not a rogue 
operation established by lower level Japanese soldiers; rather, 
it was part of the Japanese war planning.  As one commentator 
explains: 
The system was as much of a military operation as the more con-
ventional  aspects of Japan’s war efforts.  Japanese military doc-
                                                             
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 64. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 65-66. 
111 Id. at 66. 
112 Id. at 67. 
113 Id. 
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uments literally described the women as ‘war supplies.’  Numer-
ous Japanese military regulations detailed the procedures in-
volved in setting up and operating a ‘comfort women’ facility.  
The military constructed buildings for ‘comfort women’ in the 
same manner as a barracks or dining facility.  “Comfort women’ 
were sent to consolidated staging areas before being shipped via 
military transport to nearly all the outposts of the vast Japanese 
military empire.  The women were also subjected to the dangers 
of being stationed at the military front, and many died from air 
raids against Japanese military positions.117   
i. Hirohito’s Role 
There is an abundance of evidence that Emperor Hirohito 
played a major policy role in Japan’s wartime decisions: 
. . . Hirohito guided and authorized most military decisions.  He 
sanctioned Japan’s intervention in China’s civil war in 1927; he 
‘silently endorsed’ the army’s excursion into Manchuria, even 
though it had begun the operation without notifying him; he ex 
ante sanctioned the war with China in 1937, ordering his army to 
‘destroy the enemy’s will to fight’ and ‘wipe out resistance’; he 
approved the decision to move his troops southward, accepting 
the risk of war with the United States and the United Kingdom, 
and was thus eventually forced to accept the United States’ im-
position of economic sanctions; he prematurely resolved to begin 
the war with the West and ignored the warnings of his advisors 
that Japan would not defeat the United States; he knew of the 
full plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor, removed any language 
about respect for international law from the war rescript for the 
attack, and throughout the day of the attack ‘wore his naval uni-
form and seemed to be in a splendid mood’; he ‘endorsed the de-
cision to remove the constraints of international law on the 
treatment of Chinese prisoners of war’; he was responsible for 
the use of poison gas against Chinese and Mongolians beginning 
in 1937, and in 1940 he authorized the use of bacteriological 
weapons in China; finally, Hirohito delayed in the face of immi-
nent defeat and protracted the surrender process.118   
Nine days after Japan’s surrender, the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission “published a white paper recommend-
                                                             
117 Id. at 67. 
118 Kerry Creque O’Neill, A New Customary Law of Head of State Im-
munity?: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 289, 299-300 (2002). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
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ing that Japanese war crimes suspects” be “apprehended by 
the United Nations for trial before an international military 
tribunal and that the accused include those in authority in the 
governmental, military, financial, and economic affairs of Ja-
pan.”119  The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East was explicit in denying immunity for any persons 
responsible for war crimes during the Pacific War.120  Hirohito 
could have been prosecuted for engaging in aggressive war, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
ii. The Decision Not to Prosecute Hirohito  
Despite Hirohito’s involvement in the major war decisions, 
General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Al-
lied Forces’ during the 1945-1952 occupation of Japan, made a 
decision not to indict, prosecute, or even call Hirohito as a wit-
ness despite the fact that many in the U.S. wanted him to be 
prosecuted.121  In fact, “there is no evidence that MacArthur 
ever investigated the strength of the evidence against the Em-
peror for war crimes.”122  U.S. prosecutors were even instructed 
not to mention his name during the Tokyo Tribunal trials.123  
MacArthur’s reasons for his decision not to prosecute were var-
ied,124 but the predominant reason was MacArthur’s belief that 
                                                             
119 ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 45 (1987). 
120 Article VI of the Charter states that “neither the official position, at 
any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order 
of his government or a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such ac-
cused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such 
circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires.”  Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/3ae6b39614.html.  
121 See O’Neill, supra note 118, at 302 n.98 (2002) (“An unpublished Gal-
lup opinion poll conducted in early June 1945 disclosed that 77 percent of the 
American public wanted the Emperor severely punished.”). 
122 Id. at 302.   
123 See Richard John Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission 
Covering World War II Era Japanese War Crimes, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COM. L. 
59, 73 (2003). 
124 “One factor that cannot be overlooked in determining why Emperor 
Hirohito was not indicted is the effectiveness of high-ranking Japanese offi-
cials and Japanese propaganda machines in presenting to Westerners and 
Japanese alike an image of the Emperor as an apolitical constitutional mon-
21
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Hirohito would assist the occupation and rebuilding of Ja-
pan.125 “MacArthur believed that, given the Japanese public 
support of Hirohito, prosecuting him ‘would result in ‘a condi-
tion of underground chaos and guerilla warfare in mountainous 
and outlying regions,’ thus necessitating an additional one mil-
lion soldiers for occupational duty in a more hostile Japan.”126   
 Hirohito remained the monarch of Japan until his death 
in 1989.127  The failure to prosecute Hirohito, or to otherwise 
create a public record of his crimes, denied justice to his many 
victims and reduced “any sense of national shame or guilt over 
the atrocities committed by Japanese forces.”128  Because their 
emperor was never held accountable for the war, many Japa-
nese citizens refused to accept responsibility for Japan’s role in 
the war.  
 The main reason why Japanese war crimes were so 
quickly forgotten had to do with Hirohito himself.  The legiti-
macy of Japan’s wars of aggression, – the belief that it had in-
vaded various Asian and Pacific countries in order to liberate 
them, – could not be fully discredited unless Hirohito was sub-
jected to trial and interrogation in some forum for his role in 
the wars; especially his inability or disinclination to hold Ja-
pan’s armed forces to any standard of behavior morally higher 
than loyalty and success.  Many Japanese, after all, had been 
complicit with him in waging war, and the nation as a whole 
came to feel that, because the emperor had not been held re-
sponsible, neither should they.129 
                                                                                                                                        
arch who bore no responsibility for the war.”  Kerry Creque O’Neill, A New 
Customary Law of Head of State Immunity?  Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 289, 300 (2002).  “General MacArthur constituted a second deter-
mining factor in the decision not to indict Emperor Hirohito.”  Id. at 301.  
“[T]he third factor was race.”  Id. at 303. 
125 Id. at 72. 
126 Galvin, supra note 94, at 72. 
127 MCARTHUR (WGBH Educational Foundation 1999) available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/pandeAMEX97.html.  
128 Galvin, supra note 94, at 72 (quoting GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 191 (Penguin Press 
1999)). 
129 Galvin, supra note 94, at 72-73 (quoting HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO 
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 617-18 (Harper Collins Publishers 2000)). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
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B. Idi Amin of Uganda 
On January 25, 1971, Idi Amin became the leader of 
Uganda as a result of a coup, which he led.130  Amin’s seizure of 
power was initially celebrated by Ugandans and was also sup-
ported by the international community: “[t]hey ranged from the 
British and Israelis in the early years to the Kenyans, Ameri-
cans, Soviets, French, Libyans, Saudi Arabians, Pakistanis and 
East Germans in subsequent years.”131  Amin believed that in 
order to survive in power, he needed to destroy any opposition, 
and he began by executing the staff of the previous prime min-
ister by firing squad.132  He saw intellectuals as a threat be-
cause he believed that they could see through his actions so he 
killed the educated, which included lawyers, clergymen, stu-
dents, teachers, and doctors.133   Amin’s victims also included 
cabinet ministers, Supreme Court judges, diplomats, university 
rectors, educators, prominent Catholic and Anglican church-
men, hospital directors, surgeons, bankers, tribal leaders and 
business executives.134   
Most of those killed were ordinary people.  For instance, 
members of the Acholi and Langi tribes were killed because 
they had been the power bases of the ousted prime minister,135 
and on the first anniversary of Amin’s coup, 503 prisoners at 
Mutakula Prison were killed.136  Amin’s police forces were al-
lowed to kill in order to obtain the victims’ money, houses, or 
women, or because the tribal groups the victims belonged to 
were marked for humiliation. 137 Amin’s private army, the 
State Research Bureau,138 was instructed to find and kill any 
                                                             
130 See Idi Amin, a Brutal Dictator of Uganda, Is Dead at 80, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/16/world/idi-
amin-a-brutal-dictator-of-uganda-is-dead-at-80.html. 
131 JUNE STEPHENSON, TYRANTS IN OUR TIME: LIVES OF FOURTEEN 
DICTATORS (Diemer, Smith Publ’g Co., Inc., Kindle edition 2011). 
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134 Michael T. Kaufman, Idi Amin, Murderous and Erratic Ruler of 
Uganda in the 70’s, Dies in Exile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/17/world/idi-amin-murderous-and-erratic-
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dissidents.139   
   Amin used Catholics, Asians, and Jews as scapegoats.  
He killed many Catholics because he saw them as prohibiting 
Uganda from becoming a Muslim nation.140  His soldiers were 
allowed to kill Christians as they wished.141  Asians, mostly In-
dians and Pakistanis, were his prime scapegoats.142  Most of 
the Asians were third-generation descendants of workers 
brought by the British to Uganda.143  Many were merchants 
and shopkeepers in Uganda.144  Amin accused them of economic 
sabotage and on August 5, 1972, he ordered the Asian popula-
tion of Uganda, about 40,000 at the time, to leave the country 
within three months.145  They were only allowed to take what 
they could carry by hand.146  Their property was confiscated 
and given to army officers in payment for their loyalty.147  
 Human rights groups and exiles estimate that approxi-
mately 300,000 Ugandans were killed during Amin’s reign.148  
Amin’s human rights violations did not receive the interna-
tional attention they should have at the time because the 
world’s attention was focused on other events, such as “Vi-
etnam, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, kidnappings, the Munich 
Olympic Games killings, student riots, the Arab-Israeli ten-
sions, hijackings, and the rest.”149  When Amin was confronted 
with allegations of human rights violations he simply lied:  he 
blamed the deaths on border clashes or accidents.150 Addition-
ally, when people disappeared, he claimed that the government 
was investigating their absences but nothing was ever discov-
ered.151   
 Amin’s regime ended as a result of a war he initiated 
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against Tanzania.  During this war, Amin’s army seized Tan-
zanian soldiers and took them to slave labor camps.152  His sol-
diers raped, killed and looted Tanzanian citizens.153  On April 
10, 1979, Kampala, the capital of Uganda, fell to Tanzania.154  
Tanzanian soldiers raided Amin’s home, but Amin had already 
fled.  Amin, along with his wives, children and an entourage, 
had been flown to Libya in a Libyan plane.155  Amin eventually 
found refuge in Saudi Arabia, where he lived in luxury for 
years.156  He tried to return to Uganda in 1989, but was pre-
vented from doing so by the Ugandan government.157  Amin 
died in 2003 without ever having to face justice.  He could have 
been prosecuted for: initiating an aggressive war against Tan-
zania; the possible genocide that resulted from his ordering 
Asians to leave Uganda; crimes against humanity for the indis-
criminate killing of his people; and war crimes as a result of 
the mistreatment of Tanzanians during the war.  As one hu-
man rights organization summarizes, “’[i]t’s too bad that death 
caught up with Idi Amin before justice did.  Amin was respon-
sible for widespread murder and the expulsion of his country’s 
Asian community, and yet he was able to escape reckoning.’”158  
C. Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti 
 Haiti was ruled by Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier from 
1957-1971.159  Although Papa Doc was initially democratically 
elected, he subsequently became a ruthless dictator who did 
whatever he had to do to maintain power.  He created his own 
personal militia, the Tonton Macoutes, and empowered them to 
locate anyone who spoke out against him.160  Many citizens 
were murdered; especially those who plotted coups to remove 
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him from office.161  Many more were tortured.162  There were 
forced disappearances.163  He shut down newspapers.164  Ac-
cording to the International Commission of Jurists, who evalu-
ated his government after he had been in office for 10 years, 
[t]he systematic violation of every single article and paragraph of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seems to be the only 
policy which is respected and assiduously pursued in the Carib-
bean Republic. The rule of law was long ago displaced by a reign 
of terror and the personal will of its dictator, who has awarded 
himself the title of President of the Republic, and appears to be 
more concerned with the suppression of real or imaginary at-
tempts against his life than with governing the country.165 
 It is estimated that over forty thousand Haitians lost 
their lives during Papa Doc’s presidency.166  After suffering a 
stroke in 1970, he made his eighteen-year-old son, Jean-Claude 
“Baby Doc” Duvalier, his successor.167   One year later, Papa 
Doc died and his handpicked successor, his nineteen-year-old 
son, succeeded him.168  Both Papa Doc and Baby Doc had the 
support of the United States during their tenures because they 
were strongly anti-communist,169 and the U.S. did not want an-
other Cuba so close to its border.170   
Baby Doc continued his father’s repressive regime, and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights conducted an 
observation visit of Haiti from August 16 through August 25, 
1978.171  The Commission found numerous instances of human 
rights violations during Baby Doc’s regime.  For instance, the 
Commission found instances of individuals who had disap-
                                                             
161 Id.  
162 Id.  
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id. 
166 See IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI, 25 (Univ. Of Chi-
cago Press 1997). 
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171 See Haiti 1979 - Introduction, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.46, doc. 66 rev. 1 ¶ A(3) (1979), available at 
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peared after being detained by the police, or the Tonton Ma-
coutes, and who had never been seen or heard from again.172  
The Commission also listed the names of 151 individuals who 
were either executed in prison or who died in prison because of 
a lack of medical care.173  The lack of medical care resulted in 
many deaths from tuberculosis and diarrhea.174  The Commis-
sion also found that Haitian citizens were summarily execut-
ed.175  Summary executions took place at the notorious Fort 
Dimanche prison.176  The Commission report described the exe-
cutions as follows: 
[t]he form of execution is barbarous. In recent years, they haven’t 
been wasting bullets on executing prisoners. They make prison-
ers walk forward one by one in the night towards the sea. And 
they club them on the back of the neck, like dogs. The soft thud of 
the clubs can be heard in the cells.177 
The Commission found the conditions at Fort Dimanche, 
where political prisoners were housed, to be especially brutal.  
According to the Commission, “once there, prisoners are always 
savagely tortured.”178  “They are undressed and examined like 
beasts of burden, not for medical purposes, but in order to hu-
miliate them.”179  The cells were overcrowded and ,as a result, 
the prisoners slept in relays.180  Prisoners were forced to sleep 
on cement floors for the first three months of their detention.181  
The cells were too hot in the summer and too cold in the win-
ter.182  The sanitary conditions in the cells were horrendous:  
the inmates were “eaten up by vermin (body lice, head lice, bed 
bugs) and by mosquitoes that come up from the swamps sur-
rounding the prison and carry malaria and other illnesses.”183  
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http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Haiti79eng/chap.2.htm. 
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The prisoners were not given toilet paper or soap or allowed to 
bathe.184  Since there were no toilets, the prisoners were forced 
to use buckets filled with feces as latrines.185  They were also 
provided with inadequate food and medical care.186  Not sur-
prisingly, given these horrible conditions, the mortality rate in 
the prison was high.  Inmates rarely survived for more than a 
year.187  When a prisoner died, the body was not immediately 
removed:  
[s]ometimes the body stays in the cell for some hours after the 
death, until the jail officer deigns to authorize its removal. Some-
times the prisoners are obliged to eat their meager meals over 
the corpse of a prison companion who has just died. . .It has 
sometimes happened that dogs eat the corpse.”188    
 The Commission also found that Haitian citizens were 
subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.  The accused often 
languished in prison for minor infractions as well as for serious 
crimes without being brought to justice.189  Some inmates had 
been condemned to between three and six months imprison-
ment without the benefit of due process.190  One of the Commis-
sion’s final recommendations was “[t]hat [Haiti] investigate 
and punish those responsible for the numerous violations of the 
right to life and physical security.”191   
 By 1986, Haiti became ungovernable as a result of politi-
cal corruption and economic problems and Baby Doc fled for ex-
ile in France.192   Baby Doc has never been prosecuted for the 
human rights violations that occurred during his presidency.  
After living 25 years in exile, Baby Doc returned to Haiti.193  
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has re-
newed its earlier recommendation that he be investigated and 
punished for the “torture, extrajudicial executions and forced 
disappearances committed during the regime of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier [which] are crimes against humanity that, as such are 
subject neither to a statute of limitations nor to amnesty 
laws.”194  
D. Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines  
Ferdinand Marcos was elected President of the Philippines 
in 1965 and was reelected in 1969.195  The Philippine Constitu-
tion limited him to two, four year terms, so that he was re-
quired to leave office in 1973.196  On September 21, 1972, Mar-
cos declared martial law.197  He justified the declaration of 
martial law on the need to restore law and order.198  However, 
these were not communist insurrections as Marcos claimed: 
It was government sponsored terrorism.  All these bombings in 
the weeks before martial law . . . of the department stores, pri-
vate companies, government buildings, waterworks . . . weren’t 
part of the communists’ plot to take over the country.  They were 
the work of the Marcos government, part of the plan to justify 
seizing control of the  nation.199   
The declaration of martial law immediately halted a Con-
stitutional Convention.  The Constitutional Convention, elected 
by the people, had been meeting at the time martial law had 
been declared and was near completion..200  Some of the dele-
gates to the Convention were arrested and placed under deten-
tion while others went into hiding and left the country.201  The 
termination of the Constitutional Convention allowed Marcos 
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to revise the Constitution to permit him to remain in power 
and expand his authority.202 
 The martial law declaration set the stage for acts of tor-
ture, summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detention 
and numerous other atrocities.203  Marcos authorized the ar-
rests of a long list of dissidents, which included Congressmen, 
activists in student movements, labor leaders, reporters, pub-
lishers, aspiring politicians who could someday defeat Marcos 
and anyone else who threatened Marcos’s regime.204  Those ar-
rested were subjected to “tactical interrogation” in an attempt 
to elicit information from them regarding opposition to the 
Marcos government.205  A federal district court described the 
following methods that were used on those arrested: 
1) Beatings while blindfolded by punching, kicking and hitting 
with the butts of rifles; 
 2) The ‘telephone’ where a detainee’s ears were clapped simul-
taneously, producing a ringing sound in the head; 
 3) Insertion of bullets between the fingers of a detainee and 
squeezing the hand; 
 4) The ‘wet submarine,’ where a detainee’s head was sub-
merged in a toilet bowl full ofexcrement; 
 5) The ‘water cure,’ where a cloth was placed over the detain-
ee’s mouth and nose, and water poured over it producing a 
drowning sensation; 
 6) The ‘dry submarine,’ where a plastic bag was placed over 
the detainee’s head producing suffocation; 
 7) Use of a detainee’s hands for putting out lighted cigarettes; 
 8) Use of flat-irons on the soles of detainee’s feet; 
 9) Forcing a detainee while wet and naked to sit before an air 
conditioner often while  sitting on a block of ice; 
 10) Injection of a clear substance into the body of a detainee 
believed to be truth serum; 
 11) Stripping, sexually molesting and raping female detainees; 
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one male plaintiff testified he was threatened with rape; 
 12) Electric shock where one electrode is attached to the geni-
tals of males or the  
 breast of females and another electrode to some other part of 
the body, usually a 
 finger, and electrical energy produced from a military field tel-
ephone is sent through the body; 
 13) Russian roulette; and 
 14) Solitary confinement while hand-cuffed or tied to a bed.206 
As Marcos feared his power was slipping away, repression 
became more brutal.  In 1984, eight journalists were killed in 
the Philippines, and six more were killed in 1985.207  Human 
rights lawyers were also targeted, which led the president of 
the American Bar Association to send a letter to Marcos ex-
pressing his concern over the extensive abuse of human rights 
lawyers.208  During his visit to the Philippines, the Pope criti-
cized Marcos.209  As resistance to Marcos heightened, the Unit-
ed States, which had previously supported Marcos during his 
regime, pressured him to leave office because of fear of a com-
munist takeover.210   
 After twenty years in office, Marcos and his family fled to 
Hawaii along with the enormous wealth they amassed over the 
years.211  When he was first elected Marcos was worth approx-
imately $30,000; when he left office in 1986 his net worth was 
estimated to be $15 billion.212  No criminal investigation of 
Marcos or his human rights abuses, including torture, arbi-
trary detention, summary execution, disappearance, 213ever oc-
curred either in the Philippines or elsewhere before his death 
in 1989.  Because of his enormous wealth and connections to 
the United States, Marcos and his estate were sued in the 
United States by those whose human rights had been abused 
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by Marcos and his regime.  A federal district court in Hawaii 
found Marcos’s estate liable for atrocities and torture commit-
ted during his twenty year reign and a total of $1.2 billion in 
damages were awarded to his victims.214 
IV. ERA OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Hirohito, Amin, Duvalier, Marcos and others were never 
held accountable largely because of Cold War politics and the 
desire to avoid further bloodshed and unrest.  Since the end of 
the Cold War, the movement for individual criminal accounta-
bility has gained considerable momentum, and individuals 
have increasingly been prosecuted for human rights violations. 
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has described 
this era as the “new age of accountability” replacing an “old era 
of impunity.”215  There are still transgressors who go unpun-
ished,216 but that is becoming the exception and not the rule, as 
it was during the Cold War.  There are now demands for ac-
countability wherever systemic human rights violations are oc-
curring.  Unlike the era of impunity, the current emphasis is on 
attaining justice.  There were two crucial developments, which 
have made this new era of accountability possible: 1) the great-
er use of universal jurisdiction by individual nations, and 2) the 
creation of international criminal tribunals.   
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A. Greater Use Of Universal Jurisdiction 
 Since the end of the cold war, the principle of universal 
jurisdiction has been invoked more frequently as the basis for 
prosecuting human rights violators.  One of the most important 
cases concerned Spain’s attempt to prosecute former President 
of Chile, Augusto Pinochet.  Between 1974 and 1990 Pinochet 
was President of Chile.217  During his tenure, harsh techniques 
including torture, executions and disappearances were used 
against his political opponents.218  Before Pinochet left office, 
he attempted to shield himself from any accountability for his 
actions by making himself a senator for life and granting him-
self amnesty from prosecution.219  After Pinochet settled in 
England, Spain initiated a prosecution for torture committed 
during his presidency and sought his extradition.220  Pinochet 
claimed that he could not be prosecuted because of his former 
status as head of state.221  A majority of the House of Lords 
held that under the Convention Against Torture, a former head 
of state (Pinochet) could be extradited to a third state (Spain), 
for alleged torture committed in another state (Chile) against 
nationals and non-nationals of the third state while the ac-
cused held office.222   
There have been other recent prosecutions based on uni-
versal jurisdiction.223  The courts of Denmark and Germany re-
lied on universal jurisdiction in trying Croatian and Bosnian 
Serbs for war crimes committed in Bosnia.224  Courts in Bel-
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gium and Canada have invoked universal jurisdiction as a ba-
sis for prosecuting individuals involved in the Rwandan geno-
cide.225  Finally, the United States used universal jurisdiction 
to justify the prosecution of Charles Taylor, Jr. for torture 
committed in Sierra Leone in the 1990s.226  
ii. Creation of International Tribunals 
Despite the increased willingness of domestic courts to 
prosecute individuals for human rights violations, there are 
still occasions when international tribunals are needed.  This is 
especially the case when widespread and systemic human 
rights violations have occurred, such as in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia.  The breadth of the atrocities committed in 
those countries was simply too much for any judicial system to 
handle.227  Furthermore, domestic prosecutions are sometimes 
blocked because of amnesties and immunities.228  Once the cold 
war ended, the United Nations was able to create ad-hoc tribu-
nals to prosecute the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwan-
da.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) was the first international criminal tribunal cre-
ated since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.  The ICTY was 
established by the United Nations Security Council to try “per-
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sons responsible for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991.”229  A year later, the Security Council established 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in or-
der to try “persons responsible for genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of 
Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”230   
iii. International Criminal Court 
The most significant development during the “new age of 
accountability” has been the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”).  The ICC is the culmination of a long 
effort to ensure individual criminal accountability for human 
rights violations.  The ICC was created by a significant number 
of states in the Treaty of Rome.231  The treaty was finalized in 
1998, and it went into effect in 2002.232  The Treaty of Rome 
contains a 128-article statute which creates a permanent court, 
the ICC, with compulsory jurisdiction and an independent 
prosecutor.233  The ICC has jurisdiction over four crimes: geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of ag-
gression.234  In order for the ICC to assert jurisdiction, the case 
must have been referred by the UN Security Council or the 
crimes must have occurred in the territory of a state party or 
the perpetrator must be a national of a state party willing to 
permit the ICC to assert jurisdiction.235  The ICC can receive 
cases from either any state party or the UN Security Council or 
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10 acquittals.  See Abby Seiff, Seeking Justice in the Killing Fields, 99 A.B.A. 
J. 50, 54 (March 2013).   
231 Information about the ICC’s creation is available on its website: 
http://www.icc-cp.int/Pages/default.aspx. 
232 Id. 
233 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,  
U.N. Doc.  A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
234 Rome Statute, art. 5. 
235 Rome Statute, art. 12. 
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the prosecutor can initiate an investigation.236  The Rome stat-
ute is clear in that the fact that an individual’s status as head 
of state or government official “shall in no case exempt a per-
son from criminal responsibility” nor lead to a reduction in sen-
tence.237   
 The Rome statute, however, does contain provisions 
which will make it difficult to bring some individuals to justice.  
First and foremost, the Rome statute is a treaty and not a reso-
lution of the Security Council.  As a result, it is only binding on 
states which have signed and ratified the treaty.  Although the 
treaty has been widely adopted, some important states have 
not yet signed and ratified it, including the United States, Rus-
sia and China.238  These three states have engaged in activities 
that could amount to cognizable crimes under the statute - 
China’s activities in Tibet,239 Russia’s military action in 
Chechnya,240 and the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo Bay.241  These states are under no obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC and the perpetrators of these possible 
crimes cannot be brought to justice since their nations have not 
yet signed and ratified the treaty.  Second, the ICC has no po-
lice force to enforce its orders.  Rather, it has to rely on state 
parties to enforce its orders.242  The ICC has already experi-
enced difficulty in having its orders enforced by state parties.  
For instance, it has issued an arrest warrant for President 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir of Sudan yet Al-Bashir travels 
freely in Africa through the territory of various state parties 
and has not been arrested.  Finally, the statute provides the 
court with “complimentary” jurisdiction.243  As a result, the 
                                                             
236 Rome Statute, art. 13. 
237 Rome Statute, art. 27. 
238 A list of state parties is available on the ICC’s website, supra note 
230. 
239 See, Annual Report 2013 - China, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, available 
at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/China/report-2013.  
240 See Annual Report 2013 – Russian Federation, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, available at http//www.amnesty.org/en/Russia/report-2013. 
241 See Annual Report 2013 - United States, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/usa/report-2013#section-157-3.  
242 Rome Statute, art. 59(1) (“A state party which has received a request 
for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take 
steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws . . .”). 
243 Rome Statute, art. 17. 
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ICC is required to defer to domestic courts as long as they are 
both genuinely willing and able to act.244  
 Despite these limitations, the creation of the ICC is ar-
guably the most important development in international law 
since the creation of the United Nations.  The fact that the ICC 
is a permanent tribunal addresses the Nuremberg problem of 
“victor’s justice.”  Most importantly, the ICC is an assurance 
that those who violate human rights can ultimately be brought 
to justice.  Therefore, the modern era of accountability, even 
with all its flaws, is preferable to the Cold War “era of impuni-
ty.”  
V. ALTERNATIVES TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
“The only way to bring true healing to a divided society is to face 
up to the wrongs  that were committed, to prosecute those who vi-
olated fundamental human rights of others, and to provide com-
pensation to the victims.”245 
The drive to investigate, prosecute and provide compensa-
tion to victims of human rights abuses has gained considerable 
momentum since the end of the Cold War. This is a remarkable 
achievement.  There are those who believe that individuals who 
commit human rights violations must always be prosecuted in 
order to provide justice for the victims and to deter others from 
committing similar atrocities.  While there should always be an 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and in many cases criminal 
prosecution should be the preferred method of holding individ-
uals accountable for their crimes, there are instances in which 
the threat of prosecution can actually prolong wars and inhibit 
the attainment of peace. Therefore, international law should 
recognize and accept that no one approach works for every his-
torical event.  As one scholar has stated: 
certain situations, and to accept plea agreements for reduced 
charges in many other situations, some historical episodes seem 
to justify a merciful approach with reduced penalties or simply a 
full description of what actually happened.  In some situations 
pardons appear to be justified after part of the sentence has been 
                                                             
244 Rome Statute, art. 17. 
245 Jon M. Van Dyke, The Fundamental Human Right to Prosecution and 
Compensation, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 77 (2001). 
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served to foster reconciliation.  But in each situation, a full inves-
tigation and disclosure of what occurred seems essential to en-
sure that the culprits’ deeds are known by all and to prevent 
them from ever exercising power again.246   
Examples of the different approaches  addressing egre-
gious human rights violations that also allow a society to end 
civil strife and hostilities and to transition to peace are provid-
ed by Sierra Leone and South Africa, both of which are exam-
ined in more detail below.   
A. Sierra Leone 
A civil war in the West African nation of Sierra Leone be-
gan in 1991 and ended in 2002.247  The fighting initially began 
as a struggle between factions but was later focused against 
the government.248  Rebels of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led 
the war against the government.249During the civil war, sys-
temic human rights atrocities were committed by both the RUF 
and AFRC as well as by the forces supporting the government, 
the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF).250  The conflict in Sierra Le-
one became widely known around the world for the practice of 
amputating limbs of civilians.251  Machetes were used to ampu-
tate one or both hands, arms, feet, legs, ears, or buttocks and 
one or more fingers.252  The victims would often have to finish 
the amputation or would be forced to select which body part 
they wanted to be amputated.253  They were told to take their 
amputated limbs to the President.254  Civilians also had one or 
both of their eyes gouged out, suffered gunshot wounds to the 
head, torso and limbs, burns from explosives and other devices 
                                                             
246 Id. at 94. 
247 Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the 





250 VanDyke, supra note 244 78-79. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 78. 
253 Id.  
254 Id. 
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and were injected with acid.255   
Women and children especially suffered during the civil 
war.  Many children were forced into fighting.256  They were al-
so murdered, beaten, mutilated, tortured, raped and sexually 
enslaved.257  Women and girls were victims of gang rapes at 
gunpoint or knifepoint.258  Some rapes occurred in front of the 
victims’ family members or in some cases, rebels forced a fami-
ly member to rape a sister, mother or daughter.259  Witnesses 
reported seeing the mutilated bodies of pregnant women whose 
fetuses were cut out of the wombs or shot to death in their ab-
domen.260   
 On July 7, 1999, all the warring factions signed a peace 
accord.261  The rebels were given key posts in the government 
in exchange for a cease-fire.262  A key provision of the agree-
ment provided a blanket amnesty to all groups for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity that occurred during the civil 
war.263  Although the grant of blanket amnesty for such egre-
                                                             
255 Id.  
256 Id.   
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 79. 
260 Id. 
261 Priscilla Hayner, December 2007 Report, Negotiating peace in Sierra 
Leone: Confronting the justice challenge, 5 (Dec. 2007). 
262 Id. at 21. 
263 Id. at 14 (Article IX of the agreement provided as follows: 1, In order 
to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall 
take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and 
free pardon.  
2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra 
Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combat-
ants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in the pursuit of 
their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. 
3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconcilia-
tion, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial 
action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA [Sierra 
Leone Army] or CDF [Civil Defence Force] in respect of anything done by in 
pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations, since March 
1991, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.  In addition, 
legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former 
combatants, exiles, and other persons, currently outside the country for rea-
sons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise 
of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a 
framework of full legality.).   
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gious crimes was opposed by the United Nations264and interna-
tional human rights groups,265 nearly everyone involved in the 
talks or who closely observed them, agreed that the amnesty 
was necessary for a peace agreement to be reached: 
One UN official who observed many of the discussions around the 
amnesty recalls his sense that the options of the UN were lim-
ited: ‘Were we going to say that because of that amnesty, the 
whole document was to be scrapped?  If we didn’t sign, then the 
agreement couldn’t be implemented.  We wouldn’t have a man-
date for a UN mission, for example.  It was a big dilemma.’  He 
considered the urgency to end the war to be most important.  ‘It 
was about strategy and tactics.  The strategy was to pursue 
peace.  The tactics included: don’t let justice get in the way.  It 
was the price to pay for peace.’266   
 The agreement did provide for the creation of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) “to address impunity, 
break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims 
and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story 
[and to] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate gen-
uine healing and reconciliation.”267  The agreement also provid-
ed for a Special Fund for War Victims to make reparation to 
the victims.268   
Ten months after the peace accord was signed, violence re-
sumed.  As a result, the government made a formal request to 
the United Nations for the establishment of a special court to 
try the head of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, and others for clearly 
                                                             
264 Although the United Nations signed the peace agreement, the follow-
ing notation was made on its behalf next to its signature: “The United Na-
tions holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in Article IX of 
the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.”  Id. at 5. 
265 The grant of blanket amnesty was opposed by Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch. Id. at 23. 
266 Id. at 17.   (. . . “almost none of those present, including the human 
rights advocates, now believe that a peace agreement would have been possi-
ble without some provision of amnesty for past crimes.”) Id. at 6;  (“Refusing 
to sign the accord because it included an amnesty (which was not, in fact, an 
approach even considered by the government) would have scrapped the 
chance for a negotiated peace altogether, according to virtually all partici-
pants.”).  Id. at 24.   
267 Id. at 19. 
268 Id. at 20. 
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and flagrantly violating the peace accords.269 A Special Court 
for Sierra Leone was founded in 2002 through an agreement 
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Na-
tions.270  The Special Court was a “hybrid” court consisting of 
both national and international judges, prosecutors, defense 
counsel and other personnel.271  In 2003, the Court indicted 
thirteen individuals including Foday Sankoh.272  Those convict-
ed include three former members of the AFRC, two former 
members of the CDF, and three former members of the RUF.273  
In addition, Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president, was 
indicted for planning, aiding and abetting the atrocities that 
were committed during the Sierra Leone civil war.274  He was 
subsequently convicted, the first former head of state convicted 
by an international tribunal since Nuremberg, and sentenced 
to 50 years.275The combination of amnesty, a Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, prosecutions and reparations has finally 
brought peace to Sierra Leone.   
B. South Africa 
 Apartheid was the official policy of the white minority 
South African government from 1948 to 1993. In order to main-
tain white supremacy, the white minority enacted hundreds of 
laws to control and disadvantage the black majority and other 
non-whites.276  For instance, every South African was classified 
into one of four racial categories: white, black, colored and oth-
                                                             
269 Id. at 25. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 26. 
272 Id.  Sankoh died in 2003 of natural causes while in custody and there-
fore he was never tried.     
273 See generally Special Court For Sierra Leone , http://www.sc-
sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx (presenting information about aforemen-
tioned cases).  
274 Marlise Simons and David Goodman, Ex-Liberian Leader Gets 50 
Years for War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/05/31/world/africa/charles-taylor-sentenced-to-50-years-for-war-
crimes.html. 
275 Id.  
276 The Truth and Reconciliation Report of South Africa Volume 1, The 
DOJ & CD 448, 97 (Oct. 29, 1998), available at, http://www.justice.gov.za/ 
reportfiles/other/PresFund_ANR_2007-08.pdf (including a full list of all the 
apartheid laws).  
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ers.277 The white minority resided in the most desirable areas 
of the country whereas black South Africans were not allowed 
to live in the cities.278 One of the most egregious apartheid era 
laws was the pass laws, which required blacks to carry a pass 
whenever they were outside their home areas, and failure to 
carry a pass would result in either a fine or imprisonment.279 
Black South Africans, additionally, were not allowed to vote,280 
and certain jobs were reserved for whites only.281  The educa-
tion of blacks was controlled by the government and was de-
signed to produce a subservient and obedient labor force.282  
Blacks were not allowed to use public facilities such as parks, 
libraries, zoos, beaches and sports grounds.283  In short: 
Apartheid was a grim daily reality for every black South African.  
For at  least 3.5 million black South Africans it meant collective 
expulsion, forced  migration, bulldozing, gutting or seizure of 
homes, the mandatory carrying of passes, forced removals into 
rural ghettos and increased poverty and  desperation.284   
 In countries that experienced similar repression, such as 
the United States, it is typically the majority that suppresses 
the minority.  South Africa was unique in that the white minor-
ity suppressed the black majority.  In order to maintain white 
                                                             
277 The Population Registration Act defined a white person as “one who is 
in appearance obviously white – and generally accepted as Coloured – or who 
is generally accepted as White – and is not obviously Non-White, provided 
that a personal shall not be classified as a White person if one of his natural 
parents has been classified as a Coloured person or a Bantu.” Id. at 30.  
Blacks were classified as Bantu defined as “a person who is, or is generally 
accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa.”  Id.  Col-
oureds were defined as someone “who is not a white person or a Bantu.”  Id. 
278 The 1950 Group Areas Act restricted where blacks could live.  See Id. 
at 31. 
279 The Black (Native) Laws Amendment Act No. 54 was enacted in 1952.  
See Id. at 454. 
280 The 1951 Separate Representation of Voters Act No. 46 and the 1956 
South Africa Act Amendment Act No. 9 disenfranchised voters of color.  Id. at 
453, 456. 
281 For instance, the Black Building Workers Act No. 27 of 1951 prohibit-
ed blacks from performing skilled work in the building industry in white ur-
ban areas.  Id. at 453. 
282 Id. at 32. 
283 Id. 
284 J. Vora and Erika Vora, The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission; Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner, and English 
South Africans, 34 J. OF BLACK STUDIES 301, 304 (2004). 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
5. KENNETH WILLIAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2014  3:59 PM 
174 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
domination, the government had to commit egregious human 
rights violations, including torture, murder, beatings, disap-
pearances, detentions and imprisonment.  In addition, the gov-
ernment outlawed and jailed its political opponents.  For in-
stance, the government banned the leading black anti-
apartheid opposition group, the African National Congress 
(“ANC”)285 and the leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, was 
imprisoned for twenty-seven years.286   
The international community sought to put pressure on 
the South African government to dismantle its system of 
apartheid by imposing economic sanctions.287  Eventually the 
sanctions and the international isolation forced many South 
African whites to the realization that they could not maintain 
the system of apartheid, and that attempting to do so would on-
ly lead to civil war and political instability.  The white minori-
ty, after all, controlled much of the nation’s wealth and there-
fore had a major interest in averting chaos.   
 Negotiations over a four-year period ultimately lead to a 
peaceful transition from apartheid to black majority rule.288  A 
key issue in the negotiations was what to do about those who 
had committed human rights violations during the apartheid 
era289.  South Africans had to decide whether it should conduct 
Nuremberg type trials or whether to do nothing, as was the 
case in Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe when those nations 
transitioned to majority rule.  They chose a middle ground by 
granting conditional amnesty and by establishing a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”).290  
 The TRC was created by the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act of 1995 “as part of [the] bridge-building 
process . . . to lead the nation away from a deeply divided past 
to a future founded on the recognition of human rights and de-
                                                             
285 Id. at 302. 
286 Id. 
287 See generally Philip I. Levy, Sanctions On South Africa: What Did 
They Do?, Economic Growth Center (February 1999), available at ai-
da.wss.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp796.pdf (reviewing the sanctions imposed on 
South Africa by the international community). 
288 Lorna McGregor, Individual Accountability in South Africa: Cultural 
Optimum or Political Façade?, 95 AM J. INT’L.L. 32, 33 (2001). 
289 Id. at 34. 
290 Id. at 36-39. 
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mocracy.”291  The TRC was charged with investigating political-
ly motivated human rights abuses committed by whichever 
side of the political conflict, between March 1, 1960 and May 
10, 1994.  The goal of the TRC in investigating these crimes 
was to promote national unity and reconciliation “in a spirit of 
understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of 
the past.”292  The perpetrators who testified before the TRC 
were provided amnesty from prosecution.   
 According to all reliable accounts, the transition to de-
mocracy would not have occurred without a grant of amnes-
ty.293  There was a further concern that any attempt to prose-
cute all the perpetrators of atrocities during the apartheid era 
would overwhelm the judiciary:  
There would be too many accused and adequate punishment 
would be too costly in human, political, as well as financial terms.  
Even if we had the human and financial resources, it would not 
be a sensible or practical route to follow.  Criminal trials are un-
pleasant both for the accused and accuser.  The technicalities and 
time necessary to ensure a fair trial are themselves a source of 
tremendous frustration.294 
However, there was also a recognition that in order for the 
nation to move forward there had to be some accounting for the 
atrocities and that the pain of the victims had to be recognized: 
 The Commission sought to uncover the truth about past abus-
es.  This was part of ‘the struggle of memory against forgetting’ 
referred to by Milan Kundera.  But it was, at the same time, part 
of the struggle to overcome the temptation to remember in a par-
tisan, selective way: to recognise that  narrow memories of past 
conflicts can too easily provide the basis for mobilisation. towards 
further conflicts, as has been the case in the former  Yugoslavia 
and elsewhere.  An inclusive remembering of painful truths 
about the past is crucial to the creation of national unity and 
transcending the divisions of the past. 295    
                                                             
291 Id. at 32. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 34 (According to Minister of Justice Dullah Omar, “without an 
amnesty agreement there would have been no elections”). 
294 Id. at 36. quoting South African Justice Richard Goldstone. 
295 S. Afr. Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n, Final Report of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, vol. 1, chapter 5, p.116 (1998). 
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Not every perpetrator was granted amnesty.296  In order to 
receive amnesty, three essential criteria had to be satisfied: 1) 
amnesty applicants had to submit individual applications; 2) 
the acts for which they applied had to have had a political ob-
jective; and 3) they were required to give full disclosure of the 
relevant facts of the incidents for which they applied.297  Am-
nesty applicants who failed to satisfy these requirements would 
be liable to criminal prosecution.298  The amnesty applicant did 
not have to make a formal apology, or indicate that they were 
remorseful for their actions.299   
 The TRC began its work in 1996 and concluded in 
1998.300  The TRC conducted hearings in town halls, civic cen-
ters and churches across South Africa.  The proceedings were 
televised to the entire nation.301The TRC heard from over 
21,000 victims302 and from those perpetrators who were grant-
ed amnesty.303  Many studies done after the TRC concluded its 
work found that the TRC was a success.304  As a result, South 
Africa today is free of political violence.   
 Between 1974 and 1994, at least 15 truth commissions 
were established in other nations with varying success.305The 
                                                             
296 See generally Amnesty Hearings & Decisions, TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amtrans/ 
index.htm (receiving a total of 7112 amnesty applications of which 849 were 
granted amnesty).   
297 See generally Therese Abrahamsen & Hugo van der Merwe, Reconcili-
ation through Amnesty? Amnesty Applicants’ Views of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2005) (reasearch report written for 
the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation), available at 
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/trc/reconciliationthroughamnesty.pdf. 
298 McGregor surpa note 288 at 39.  
299 Abrahamsen, supra note 297. 
300 Vora, supra note 284 at 302. 
301 Abrahamsen, supra note 297. 
302 Richard John Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission 
Covering World War II Japanese War Crimes, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COM. L. 59, 
99 (2003). 
303 See Vora, supra note 284 at 305. 
304 Id. at 307-21(finding that black South Africans and whites believed 
that the TRC was effective in bringing out the truth.); James L. Gibson, Case 
Studies: Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?,” 603 
Annals 82 (2006)(finding that South Africa did achieve “some degree of rec-
onciliation” as a result of the TRC). 
305 See Vora, supra note 284 at 303(Truth Commissions were established 
in various countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, 
45
5. KENNETH WILLIAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2014  3:59 PM 
2014] JUSTICE OR PEACE?  177 
success of the TRC in South African and other nations demon-
strates that a rigid approach requiring criminal prosecutions in 
each and every instance in which gross human rights atrocities 
have occurred may not fit a particular situation and that more 
flexibility is required.  South Africa never would have had a 
peaceful transition to democracy had the victims and the inter-
national community insisted on criminal prosecution of those 
responsible for apartheid era atrocities.  The South African ex-
perience demonstrates that a flexible approach is needed. 
VI. PROPOSAL 
A. Amend ICC statute 
As this article has demonstrated, it is not always in a na-
tion’s best interest to prosecute human rights violators.  The 
threat of prosecution can be a major impediment to achieving 
peace.  Therefore, the statute of the International Criminal 
Court needs to be amended in order to provide the internation-
al community more flexibility in handling these situations.  Ar-
ticle 16 of the statute presently allows the United Nations Se-
curity Council to delay investigations and prosecutions for 12 
months.306  However, perhaps Article 16 should be amended to 
permit the Security Council to permanently suspend an inves-
tigation or prosecution if it determines that doing so would best 
serve the interest of international peace and security.  In the 
event that the Security Council takes such action, the prosecu-
tor should only be allowed to commence an investigation and 
prosecution if the human rights abusers seek to return or actu-
ally return to power or interfere in the internal affairs of that 
nation.   
 The situation in Syria can be used to provide an example 
of how the proposal would work in practice.  Suppose the Unit-
ed States and Russia engage in negotiations with the Syrian 
government and the opposition aimed at ending the civil war.  
One major impediment to reaching an agreement might be the 
prospect of criminal prosecutions.  For instance, the United Na-
tions Human Rights Council has already called on the Security 
                                                                                                                                        
Rwanda, Ethiopia, Chad, Zimbabwe, Germany, the Philippines, and others). 
306 Rome Statute, art. 16. 
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Council to refer the perpetrators of human rights atrocities in 
Syria to the ICC for prosecution.307  Thus, it is unlikely that ei-
ther side would agree to a deal ending the war without some 
assurance that they will not be prosecuted.  At present, they 
could not be given such an assurance.  Even in the event of a 
peace agreement, the ICC would still have the authority to 
bring criminal charges in the event of a referral from the Secu-
rity Council.308  There would be a lot of pressure by human 
rights groups and governments to prosecute given the extent of 
the atrocities.  The most that the Security Council could do un-
der Article 16 is to delay the investigation and prosecution for 
twelve months.309  The proposal would allow the Security 
Council to permanently suspend any investigation and prose-
cution if it determines that doing so would be in the best inter-
est of international peace and security. 
 It is not hard to imagine that if situations similar to Hai-
ti, Uganda, the Philippines and South African were to occur 
during the era of accountability, the leaders of those nations 
would not agree to relinquish power.  South Africa, for in-
stance, was only able to avert a civil war because of the amnes-
ty that was provided.  Without amnesty, a civil war would have 
been inevitable, the repression of non-whites would have wors-
ened and the bloodshed, destruction and loss of life would have 
been devastating.  In Haiti, Duvalier agreed to leave a country 
that was deteriorating into chaos.  It is doubtful that he would 
have departed if by doing so he faced the prospect of spending 
the remainder of his life in prison.  The Ugandan war against 
Tanzania might have become more protracted and bloody if 
Amin faced the prospect of being put on trial in the event that 
he lost  the war.  It may be the case that leaders such as these 
should be brought to justice even if doing so prolongs a war or 
repression.  The proposal would not prevent these individuals 
from being brought to justice;it merely provides the interna-
tional community some flexibility to consider alternatives to 
prosecution depending on the situation.  
                                                             
307 February 2013 Report, supra at note 3. 
308 See Rome Statute, art. 15, para. 1 (“The Prosecutor may initiate in-
vestigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
309 Rome Statute, art. 16. 
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B. Possible Objections 
 Some will have a legitimate concern that if Article 16 is 
amended, it will allow the permanent members of the Security 
Council310 to control the ICC.  The permanent veto311 is already 
resented by many nations and to allow the Security Council to 
permanently terminate criminal proceedings will only add to 
this resentment.  Another concern will be that extending the 
veto privilege to ICC investigations and prosecutions would 
compromise the principle of a uniform global standard of jus-
tice.  That was one of the primary rationales for creating the 
ICC.  When the Rome statute was being negotiated, the United 
States sought a provision requiring prior authorization of the 
Security Council for all ICC prosecutions and this proposal was 
rejected by the negotiators because of the concern that the veto 
would permit citizens of the permanent members of the Securi-
ty Council to escape justice.312  Why then would the interna-
tional community be receptive to a proposal that allows the 
permanent members of the Council to permanently suspend 
criminal proceedings? 
 The answer is that the proposal to amend Article 16 of 
the ICC statute differs from the United States’ proposal.  The 
United States proposal would not have permitted the prosecu-
tor to commence any investigation and prosecution without 
prior Security Council authorization.  The proposal to amend 
Article 16 does not place any such limitation on the prosecutor.  
No advance Security Council authorization would be needed to 
commence an investigation and prosecution.  The prosecutor 
would be permitted to independently commence an investiga-
tion and prosecution if she believes it to be warranted.  The Se-
curity Council would only be able to terminate the proceedings.  
In this regard the veto would actually be beneficial.  Any one of 
the permanent members of the Security Council could veto a 
                                                             
310 The permanent members of the Security Council are the United 
States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and China.  See U.N. CHARTER 
art. 23, para. 1. 
311 Any one of the permanent members of the Security Council can veto a 
resolution of the Security Council thereby preventing it from becoming law).  
See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. 
312 See David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal 
Court, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, 12-13 (1999). 
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resolution requiring termination of the ICC proceedings.  If so, 
the ICC proceedings against the human rights violator would 
continue.  Thus, the ICC prosecutor would be able to continue 
as long as she convinces at least one of the five permanent 
members of the Council that the investigation and prosecution 
is warranted.   
 To better understand the proposal, consider this factual 
scenario: suppose that the ICC were to commence an investiga-
tion into the allegations of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in Syria.  A deal has been worked out with President 
Assad and anti-government forces permitting them to go into 
exile.  However, they will agree to the deal only if they have 
some assurance that they will not be prosecuted.  The Security 
Council could then pass a resolution permanently suspending 
criminal proceedings against them as long as they do not at-
tempt to return to power and as long as they do not interfere in 
the internal affairs of Syria.  If any one of the five permanent 
members believes that there are compelling reasons for holding 
either Assad or the anti-government rebels accountable for 
their crimes, that nation could veto the resolution and the ICC 
proceedings against the perpetrators of the atrocities would 
continue.   
 The proposal might have the added benefit of encourag-
ing the United States to ratify the Rome statute, which is cru-
cial to the ICC’s ultimate success.  The United States has not 
ratified the treaty because it had several concerns.313 The pri-
mary concern was the possible assertion of jurisdiction over 
U.S. soldiers and civilian policymakers charged with war 
crimes resulting from legitimate use of force.  An additional 
concern was that because the United States plays such a prom-
inent role in world affairs, U.S. citizens may have greater expo-
sure to charges than citizens of other nations.  A related con-
cern was that U.S. citizens may become the target of political 
prosecutions by an unaccountable prosecutor.  Since the pro-
posal does involve the Security Council in a limited manner, it 
may help to alleviate these concerns and make the ICC more 
palatable to the U.S.  
                                                             
313 See generally Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. Research Ser., RL 31495, U.S. 
Policy Regarding The International Criminal Court (2006)), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31495.pdf.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The international community has come a long way in a 
relatively short period of time.  It wasn’t long ago that the in-
ternational community was unconcerned with how govern-
ments treated their own people.  World War II significantly al-
tered that view.  The world is no longer willing to sit idly by 
while people are being mistreated by the governments that are 
supposed to protect them and make their lives better.  Since 
World War II, numerous human rights violators have been 
prosecuted.  Furthermore, an entire body of law and entire ma-
chinery exists in order to bring individuals to justice for violat-
ing internationally recognized human rights.  These are lauda-
ble and remarkable accomplishments.   
 Despite the international laws and institutions that have 
been created to prevent war and protect human rights, nations 
and groups still engage in war and egregious human rights vio-
lations continue to occur.  When wars break out, the warring 
sides almost always commit human rights violations.  The pro-
spect that they could be prosecuted for crimes they commit dur-
ing war may make the parties reluctant to end the war without 
achieving total victory.  Therefore, the very laws and institu-
tions that were created to protect individuals may actually 
make it more difficult to attain peace.  In those situations the 
international community is faced with a justice or peace di-
lemma.  During the Cold War, the international community 
consistently preferred peace to justice.  Since the end of the 
Cold War, the pursuit of justice is preferred.  This article has 
put forth a proposal that permits the international community 
some flexibility when faced with this dilemma.  Just as a prose-
cutor has discretion not to prosecute, this article puts forth a 
proposal that permits the international community to forgo 
prosecution and pursue other forms of justice when necessary, 
as was done in the transformation of South Africa from a re-
pressive apartheid state, to a peaceful democracy.  
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/5
